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OBVIOUSNESS OF PRODUCT DANGERS AS A BAR TO
RECOVERY: MINNESOTA APPARENTLY ADOPTS THE
LATENT-PATENT DOCTRINE
[Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
- Minn. -, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976)].
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the turn of this century, the liability of manufacturers for
product-related injuries has seen a fundamental change.' The barriers
of privity,2 notice,3 and disclaimer' have been removed; the affirmative
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk have been
shifted from barring recovery to factors mitigating recovery;5 and manu-
facturers' liability has developed from complete exculpation of the man-
1. For a discussion of the development of manufacturers' liability to consumers for
defective products, see James, Products Liability (2 pts.), 34 TEx. L. REv. 45, 192 (1955);
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Fall]; Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965). Commencing with the original rule of Winterbottom
v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) that there could be no liability
without privity, these articles trace the development of manufacturers' liability through
four major progressive stages of increased liability: (1) liability for impure foods; (2)
liability for products judicially determined to be inherently dangerous; (3) liability for
negligence in the manufacture of products; and (4) strict liability in tort under the Ameri-
can Law Institute's RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. Since the landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960), the necessity of privity between the manufacturer and remote buyer
generally has been abolished as a requisite to plaintiffs' recovery. This abrogation of
privity was foreseen in Minnesota in Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670
(1959), where the court recognized the problems caused by continued adherence to the
privity requirement. For a good discussion of this area, see Prosser, The Fall, supra note
1, at 791.
3. Reasonable notice is a viable concept under the U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (1972 version)
when applied in a commercial context, since it protects the seller from unduly delayed
claims. However, significant case law has developed obviating the necessity of notice in
personal injury cases. See Prosser, The Fall, supra note 1, at 829.
4. When the privity requirement was vitiated, the disclaimer defense became the next
best vehicle for manufacturers to protect themselves from liability. This approach, how-
ever, generally has been rejected by courts adopting a strict liability theory of recovery.
See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 900 (1964); Prosser, The Fall, supra note 1, at 831.
5. See, e.g., Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 26, 192 N.W.2d 826, 828 (1971)
(assumption of risk reduces recovery under Minnesota's comparative negligence statute
for all actions arising after December 10, 1971). The applicability of comparative negli-
gence statutes to strict products liability actions, however, is uncertain. See generally
Note, A Reappraisal of Contributory Fault in Strict Products Liability Law, 2 WM. MITCH-
ELL L. REV. 235 (1976).
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ufacturer to strict liability for product defects.,
Precipitating this shift has been a change in the underlying rationale
of products liability law.7 Today, producers of goods for general usage
are looked upon as the centralized point in the distribution chain, where
preventive measures necessary for the protection of the consumer can
most effectively be accomplished," and where the costs of product-
related injuries can most efficiently be borne.' The emphasis of these
policy considerations is on preventing injuries through research, safety
6. Since its adoption in the leading case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), strict liability for product defects has
been recognized in at least 38 jurisdictions. See 1 R. HURSH & H. BAUrnY, AMERICAN LAW
OF PRODucTs LIABILITY § 4.41 (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1976). The doctrine was recognized in
Minnesota in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) and
first applied in Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969). Most
courts adopting the theory of strict liability in tort for product defects have relied upon
the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), which
provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if "
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
7. Compare Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842)
(court protected manufacturer through contractual privity requirement because it feared
unlimited liability would otherwise result) with McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn.
322, 338, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (1967) (court reasoned the manufacturer's liability should
be increased and costs of injuries should be absorbed by manufacturer of defective prod-
ucts as necessary expense of doing business).
8. See, e.g., 35 MINN. L. REv. 608, 609 (1950). The responsibility of the manufacturer
to provide feasible safety precautions is represented by recent decisions where manufac-
turers were required to provide safety devices to prevent industrial machine operators
from suffering injury because of momentary inadvertance. See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg.
Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972), noted in 86 HARv. L. REv. 923 (1973).
9. See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). In
discussing the rationale for strict liability under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1965), the McCormack court stated:
[Siubjecting a manufacturer to liability without proof of negligence or privity
of contract, as the rule intends, imposes the cost of injury resulting from a
defective product upon the maker, who can both most effectively reduce or
eliminate the hazard to life and health, and absorb and pass on such costs,
instead of upon the consumer, who possesses neither the skill nor the means
necessary to protect himself adequately from either the risk of injury or its
disastrous consequences.
278 Minn. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500.
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devices, and adequate warnings, with the expenses of these endeavors
being absorbed by the manufacturers, and ultimately by the consumers,
either through the costing of the products or through insurance. 0
Contrasted with this inexorable move toward greater responsibility on
manufacturers is the latent-patent rule, often termed the Campo doc-
trine." This rule, which relieves the producer from liability if the dan-
gers of the product are obvious to the user, has had a retarding effect
on the development of modern tort theories of manufacturers' liability.
In 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court apparently adopted the latent-
patent rule in Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 3 thereby
establishing a precedent in Minnesota which could have a severe impact
on plaintiffs' ability to recover for personal injuries caused by dangerous
products."
In Halvorson, the plaintiff was a construction worker assisting in sur-
facing a rural highway. 5 He grasped a portable cement leveler to steady
it while it was being lowered into place by an overhead crane, and as
he did so the boom cable of the crane contacted a 7,000 volt uninsulated
electrical power line. The electricity was transmitted down the cable,
through the leveler, and into the plaintiff, seriously injuring him. 7 Suit
was initiated against the American Hoist and Derrick Company, manu-
facturer of the crane, based on strict products liability and negligence.,'
The plaintiff alleged defective design because the crane was not
equipped with a proximity warning buzzer for electrical sources or with
an insulating hook to prevent transmission of electricity down the boom
cable."'
The trial court entered judgment against the manufacturer for the full
amount of the jury verdict,10 but the Minnesota Supreme Court re-
versed, holding the manufacturer owed the plaintiff no duty to install
safety devices or to guard against the risk of electrocution. 2' The court
10. See note 9 supra.
11. The doctrine was first articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Campo v.
Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), overruled, Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d
376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
12. See notes 56-94 infra and accompanying text.
13. - Minn. - , 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976).
14. See notes 95-158 infra and accompanying text.
15. - Minn. at - , 240 N.W.2d at 304.
16. Id. Although the operation was being supervised by the defendant employer's fore-
man, no member of the road crew was observing the positioning of the crane boom in
relation to the power lines. Id. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 305.
17. Id. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 304-05.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 306.
21. Id. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 308. The supreme court made this determination as a
matter of law, indicating the obviousness question is one for the court, not the jury, in
19771
3
et al.: Obviousness of Product Dangers as a Bar to Recovery: Minnesota Ap
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1977
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
supported its holding by reasoning that the risk of injury was obvious,
known to all employees involved, and specifically warned against in the
crane manufacturer's operating instructions." Citing the leading latent-
patent case, Campo v. Scofield, 3 the Halvorson court concluded the
plaintiff, as a matter of law, could not recover for defective product
design because the danger was obvious.24
Adoption of the latent-patent rule fundamentally alters the treatment
of plaintiffs' awareness of dangerous defects in products liability law.25
In essence, under the Campo doctrine, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing lack of awareness and, if he is unsuccessful, recovery is
absolutely barred.21 This creates an acute problem in a jurisdiction, such
Minnesota. See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., Fin. & Commerce, Feb. 4, 1977, at 5,
col. 1 (Minn. Feb. 4, 1977).
22. - Minn. at - , 240 N.W.2d at 308.
23. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), overruled, Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d
376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
24. The Halvorson court also relied upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388
(1965), which provides:
§ 388. Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use.
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use
is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel
with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for
physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by
a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Section 388 also was cited and relied upon in Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 473, 95
N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950). Section 388, however, is not the only RESTATEMENT section relevant
in design defect cases. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965) provides:
§ 398. Chattel Made Under Dangerous Plan or Design.
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it danger-
ous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others
whom he should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable
use for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the
adoption of a safe plan or design.
Section 398 therefore suggests that a manufacturer must design its products to make
them safe for foreseeable uses, which is in conflict with the Campo rule that obvious
dangers do not render a product defective. See note 45 infra and accompanying text.
25. Most courts and the comments to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)
recognize three types of plaintiffs' conduct in strict liability situations. These are negligent
failure to inspect, assumption of risk, and misuse. See, e.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co.,
45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A, comments
h, n (1965). The latent-patent rule is basically a fourth type of plaintiffs' fault, which has
the potential of encompassing the other three. See notes 74-94 infra and accompanying
text.
26. See Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2
[Vol. 3
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as Minnesota, which allows allocation of liability among the parties
through comparative fault analysis. 27 Because of its harsh results, the
latent-patent rule has been severely criticized by many courts and com-
mentators." Only weeks after Halvorson was decided the New York
Court of Appeals abandoned the latent-patent rule which it had estab-
lished twenty-six years earlier in Campo.29 Halvorson, however, can be
read as not adopting the traditional latent-patent rule as expressed in
Campo. Besides obviousness, the court also emphasized that the danger
was a matter of common knowledge to the employees and that the
manufacturer had warned of the danger in its operating manual.10 Thus,
arguably, a three-part test requiring obviousness, common knowledge of
the danger by the relevant group of which the plaintiff is a member, and
a specific warning is required to bar recovery under Halvorson.3 The
problem with this interpretation of Halvorson, however, is that the
warning was not designed to reach those employees, such as the plain-
tiff, who were not operating the crane. 2 The warning was contained in
the operator's manual, which presumably was not distributed to all the
employees.3 3 Consequently, it seems unrealistic to read Halvorson as
HoFsTRA L. REV. 521 (1974) (Campo amounts to the finding of assumption of risk as a
matter of law).
27. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976) (contributory negligence not a bar to recovery where
negligence of individual bringing the action is not as great as defendant's negligence). For
a comprehensive list of cases in this area, see C. HET & C. HEFr, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
MANUAL § 3.300 (1971 & Cum. Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as HErr & HEFT, COMPARA-
TIVE NEGLIGENCE].
28. See, e.g., 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 7.02 (1976) (citing an
exhaustive list of cases on the Campo doctrine); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 28.5, at 1543 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES].
29. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
30. The Halvorson court stated:
We hold that American Hoist did not owe this injured plaintiff any duty to
install safety devices on its crane to guard against the risk of electrocution when
the record demonstrated that risk was: (1) obvious; (2) known by all of the
employees involved; and (3) specifically warned against in American Hoist's
operations manual .... The general rule in other jurisdictions is that there is
no recovery for negligent design where the danger is obvious. [citation to Campo
omitted].
- Minn. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 308.
31. The court failed to differentiate between the three elements stated as support for
the decision and, therefore, it could be implied that all the elements are a prerequisite
before the obviousness of a product defect can relieve the manufacturer of liability. Id.
32. For a warning to be valid, and therefore adequate to relieve the manufacturer of
liability, it must be designed to reach the person who will be exposed to the unreasonable
danger. See note 70 infra and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion of adequacy
of warnings, see Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings,
23 Sw. L.J. 256 (1969).
33. The only mention made by the court concerning the warning was a quotation from
the operator's manual which required that at least a six foot clearance be maintained
around high voltage lines. - Minn. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 305. Compare id. with
19771
5
et al.: Obviousness of Product Dangers as a Bar to Recovery: Minnesota Ap
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1977
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
requiring a specific, adequate warning, and the case, at least on its face,
appears to rely primarily on the Campo doctrine.
Another possible reading of Halvorson is that it makes obviousness a
bar to plaintiffs' recovery only in those cases where no reasonable 'afety
devices are available to the manufacturer of a socially useful product.34
The trial transcript indicates that a proximity warning buzzer might not
have warned the employees of the impending danger and that the insu-
lating hook might not have effectively stopped the flow of electricity
down the boom cable." In addition, these devices were not in common
usage in the industry in 1968, but rather were optional devices available
at additional cost.3 1 Consequently, the Halvorson court may have felt
compelled to avoid imposing liability on a manufacturer who could not
reasonably have made a socially valuable product safe.3 7 This reading
of Halvorson, however, also creates problems, since the court's opinion
does not mention the apparent inadequacy of the safety devices and the
evidence introduced at trial suggests the safety devices, although not
very effective, might have worked."'
Although the implications of Halvorson are not entirely clear, one
cannot escape the conclusion that it seems to adopt the Campo latent-
Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, - N.M..... -, 560 P.2d 934, 936 (1977) (warning, printed
on boom of crane, was clearly visible to user as well as bystanders).
34. This interpretation of Halvorson is not premised on the language used by the court
but rather on a reading of the trial transcript.
35. The testimony of American Hoist and Derrick's consulting engineer revealed that
the proximity warning buzzer was not entirely effective. This was because the sensing unit
was connected to the crane boom rather than the cable and was, therefore, not necessarily
effective when the electrical contact was made with the crane cable. Trial Transcript at
377-80. Additionally, expert testimony established that, in optimum atmospheric condi-
tions, the insulating hooks would prevent 80,000 volts from passing through the hook to a
crane load. Trial Transcript at 454. Where moisture was present, either from high humid-
ity or precipitation, dangerous voltages passed through or around the insulating hook
thereby rendering it ineffective. Trial Transcript at 454-56.
36. At the time of the Halvorson accident, no crane manufacturers installed insulating
hooks as standard equipment but they were available at additional expense. The proxim-
ity warning buzzer was not offered by any crane manufacturers as either standard or
optional equipment at the time of the accident. See Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, - N.M.
-.. 560 P.2d 934, 936 (1977). The Halvorson trial testimony of the defendant crane
manufacturer's vice president for engineering revealed that American Hoist and Derrick
offered no anti-electrocution safety devices for the crane on which Halvorson was injured.
See Trial Transcript at 35-36.
37. Such a concern is a valid consideration when deciding whether to impose liability.
See note 186 infra and accompanying text.
38. The Halvorson court's opinion mentions only that there was conflicting testimony
and experimental evidence on the effectiveness of the accident prevention devices. -
Minn. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 305. These safety devices were, however, recognized and
cited in both the Occupational Safety and Health Act and in military safety circulars. See
Jasper v. Skyhook Corp., 89 N.M. 98, 102-03, 547 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (Ct. App. 1976),
rev'd, - N.M. -, 560 P.2d 934 (1977).
[Vol. 3
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patent rule. The court may not have been satisfied with the proof offered
on whether the safety devices would have avoided the injury, but its
expressed holding appears to be that recovery was barred because the
danger was obvious.
39
This Comment will examine the present status of the latent-patent
doctrine in this country, particularly in the design defect context; will
discuss the possible repercussions if Halvorson is interpreted as adopt-
ing the Campo doctrine for all products liability cases;' and will suggest
a more equitable approach to the obviousness issue.2
II. THE LATENT-PATENT RULE AND RATIONALE
The latent-patent rule was succinctly stated by the New York Court
of Appeals in the 1950 landmark decision of Campo v. Scofield,4" a case
where the plaintiff's hands were amputated when they became caught
in an onion-topping machine:"
The cases establish that the manufacturer of a machine or any other
article, dangerous because of the way in which it functions, and pat-
ently so, owes those who use it a duty merely to make it free from latent
defects and concealed damages. Accordingly, if a remote user sues a
manufacturer of an article for injuries suffered, he must allege and
prove the existence of a latent defect or a danger not known to plaintiff
or other users.4
39. The court emphasized that the danger was obvious to the plaintiff and therefore
seemed to be adopting a subjective standard. Reference was made to trial testimony of
the plaintiff in which he indicated that he realized the danger of the power lines and the
injury that could result. - Minn. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 308. The decision on obvious-
ness was made by court as a matter of law, thereby raising the question whether obvious-
ness can be a jury question in Minnesota. Id. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 308.
40. Halvorson is illustrative of the most common type of case in which the latent-patent
rule is invoked; the products liability design defect case. These cases are classified into
three basic categories: those involving concealed dangers; those involving failure to pro-
vide necessary safety devices; and those where inadequate materials are used. See Noel,
Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816,
820-29 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Noel, Design Liability]. For a general discussion and
listing of cases under these categories, see 2 R. HuasH & H. BAILEY, supra note 6, at § 9:1-
10.
41. See notes 95-158 infra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 159-193 infra and accompanying text.
43. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
44. Id. at 470-71, 95 N.E.2d at 803. In Campo, the plaintiff was feeding onions into
an onion-topping machine manufactured by the defendant when his hands became
caught in the steel rollers of the machine causing severe injuries and eventual amputation.
The plaintiff alleged negligence in the design of the machine, claiming available safety
devices would have prevented or, at least, mitigated his injuries. Because the complaint
failed to allege the existence of a latent defect or danger in the onion-topping machine,
the court of appeals upheld a dismissal of the complaint. Id.
45. Id. at 471, 95 N.E.2d at 803.
19771
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To appreciate the Campo rationale, the observer must consider the
historical context within which the decision was promulgated."8 At the
time Campo was decided, the affirmative defenses of assumption of risk
and contributory negligence were still complete bars to recovery in al-
most all jurisdictions. 7 The concepts of comparative negligence48 and
strict liability in tort49 were as yet unapplied, emerging theories, and the
courts were still wrestling with the increase in manufacturers' liability
which MacPherson v. Buick Motors Co." had fostered. The Campo deci-
sion therefore was a continuation of the protection provided manufac-
turers from the excessive costs courts feared would result if recovery
were granted to all consumers injured by mass-produced products."'
46. Although the Campo decision came 34 years after MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which cut through the privity barrier between the
injured consumer and the negligent manufacturer, the courts, especially in New York,
were still reluctant to increase manufacturers' liability any further than necessary. For a
considerable period after MacPherson, the New York courts continued to speak in terms
of "inherent danger," refusing liability for injury resulting from the use of normally harm-
less objects. See, e.g., Timpson v. Marshall, Meadows & Stewart, Inc., 198 Misc. 1034,
101 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (high-heeled shoes); Liedeker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
249 App. Div. 835, 292 N.Y.S. 541, aff'd mem., 274 N.Y. 631, 10 N.E.2d 586 (1937)
(collapsible beach chair). It is therefore not surprising that liability was not extended in
Campo.
The Campo decision finds support in earlier cases from several other jurisdictions,
which held that manufacturers were not liable for negligence in design defect cases when
the injuries were caused by obviously dangerous farm machinery. See Davis v. Sander-
man, 225 Iowa 1001, 1004-06, 282 N.W. 717, 719 (1938) (plaintiff was injured by the rollers
of a corn shredder); Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940)
(farmer injured when he came in contact with whirling universal joint of tractor); Yaun
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W. 2d 853 (1948) (plaintiff's arm crushed
by exposed rollers of hay baler, necessitating amputation).
47. Comparative negligence analysis gained general acceptance in this country in the
early 1970's. See HEFr & HEF'r, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, note 27 supra, at §§ 2.10-3.58.
See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974). At present, at least 20 juris-
dictions have adopted, either judicially or legislatively, some form of comparative negli-
gence. See Note, A Reappraisal of Contributory Fault in Strict Products Liability Law, 2
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 235, 247 n.109 (1976) (list of statutes and cases adopting the
comparative fault approach).
48. See note 47 supra.
49. See note 6 supra.
50. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
51. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
The rationale of the Winterbottom decision was succinctly stated by Justice Traynor when
he pointed out: "The Winterbottom rationale assumed that industry could not grow and
prosper if it had to pay for any and all injuries its defective products caused. The assump-
tion rested on the oft-disproved notion that wheels operate at peak efficiency when unat-
tended by brakes." Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 364 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings]; see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed. 1971); Note,
Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Others Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L.
REV. 134 (1937).
[Vol. 3
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For several years after the Campo decision, its rule remained intact."2
With liberalization of products liability law, however, came a relaxation
in the rigidity of the Campo rule, first evidenced in the 1960's by the
treatment of the obviousness question as one for the jury to decide. 53 The
Campo rule was further modified by some courts through the use of a
subjective standard when determining whether danger was obvious, 4
rather than the objective approach which analyzed whether the danger
would have been obvious to a reasonable person as opposed to the indi-
vidual actually injured.
5
Several rationales have been offered in support of the latent-patent
rule.5" Among the most significant are: manufacturers are not required
to produce accident-proof products;57 inherently dangerous products
provide their own warning of danger; 58 and manufacturers should not be
responsible for ignorant product misuse or for the choice of consumers
to incur an obvious risk. 9
The accident-proof rationale of Campo is premised on the belief that
manufacturers should not be made insurers of their products." Early in
52. It was not until the 1960's that a gradual erosion of the Campo doctrine commenced.
See Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make A Right: Manufactuers' Liability for
Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1065, 1081 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Marschall, An Obvious Wrong].
53. See Swearngin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637, 642 (10th Cir. 1967); Rhoads
v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367, 377 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Calkins v. Sandven, 256
Iowa 682, 691, 129 N.W.2d 1,8 (1964); Jennings v. Tamaker Corp., 42 Mich. App. 310, 316,
201 N.W.2d 654, 657 (1972); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 156, 305 N.E. 2d 769,
771, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 644, 648 (1974).
54. See, e.g., Hood v. Formatron Corp., 488 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Okla. 1971) (although open
throat of flexible hairdryer was obvious danger to adult, it was not obvious to, and there-
fore not appreciated by, two year-old whose finger was severed by machine).
55. See, e.g., Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 523, 460 P.2d 191, 194 (1969); Inman
v. Binghampton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 145-46, 143 N.E.2d 895, 899-900, 164 N.Y.S.2d
699, 704-05 (1957).
56. A rationale initially used to support Campo but which has since been all but aban-
doned by the courts is caveat emptor. The theory was used to bar the plaintiffs recovery
on the reasoning that the buyer had the alternative not to purchase the goods, and,
implicit in his purchase, was the acceptance of any product risks. See 2 HARPER & JAMES,
supra note 28, at 1545; Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133
(1931) (excellent historical analysis of the theory).
This rationale has failed for the same policy reasons that have supported the shift and
modernization of products liability law. No longer are we in the days when a consumer
hardy enough to brave the frontier is capable of navigating through our complex, indus-
trialized society without mishap. Increased product complexity and consumer reliance
have transformed "caveat emptor" into "caveat venditor." See generally LeViness,
Caveat Emptor Versus Caveat Venditor, 7 MD. L. REv. 177 (1943); Note, Let the Maker
Beware, 19 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85 (1945).
57. See notes 60-66 infra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 67-73 infra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 74-94 infra and accompanying text.
60. See Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 531 F.2d 1100, 1103 (1st Cir. 1976); Collins v. Ridge
9
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the development of products liability law, most courts held that careless
product users should bear the financial burden of their carelessness
rather than positing this burden on financially weak fledgling indus-
tries." The tremendous increase in exposure resulting from mass pro-
duction techniques, the judiciary feared, would excessively expose the
manufacturer to liability. 2 In the face of this exposure, the defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk were used to mitigate
manufacturers' liability, with the Campo obviousness standards devel-
oping later as a third form of manufacturer protection. 3
The accident-proof rationale has validity where a product, such as an
important drug, has great social utility yet cannot be made completely
safe.64 For such a product the law should not, and does not, impose
liability upon a manufacturer who has taken all precautions necessary
to make the product as safe as possible. 5 The latent-patent rule, how-
Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 47 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1976). To
prevent strict liability from being absolute liability, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
placed limiting factors on the strict liability theory. These factors are that: (1) there was
a defect; (2) the defect created an unreasonable danger; (3) the defect was in existence at
the time the property was in possession of the defendant being charged; (4) the defect
caused the injury; and (5) the injury was not also caused by any voluntary, unusual, or
abnormal handling by the plaintiff. Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 39-40,
171 N.W.2d 201, 206 (1969).
61. See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings, supra note 51, at 363. The nineteenth
century courts financially insulated growing industries by restricting their duty to the
consumer. This protection started to wane as industries became more stable and could
afford the cost of product-related injuries. Id. An additional rationale is the reluctance of
courts to leave to juries the decision on the defectiveness of a product which was developed
by experts. Furthermore, the courts feared any finding of liability would open the flood-
gates to additional claims and suits. Noel, Design Liability, supra note 40, at 816.
62. Some commentators have offered the additional reasoning that to force the use of
safety devices might cause an increase in costs which would be prohibitive and would
require manufacturers to remove their products from the market. The financial dynamics
of the market force manufacturers to reduce product costs to optimize profits and remain
competitive. See Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and
Manufacture, 52 TEX. L. REV. 81, 82-83 (1973). One of the larger costs to the manufacturer
is that of quality control inspections. A constant effort is therefore made to reduce these
costs to a minimum, sacrificing some safety to reduce costs. See Cowan, Some Policy
Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1086-87 (1965).
63. The Campo decision was promulgated in 1950, while the assumption of risk and
contributory negligence defenses were available well before then. See W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 416 n.1 (4th ed. 1971) (assumption of risk first appeared
in a negligence case in 1799, while first usage of contributory negligence occurred in 1809).
64. See, e.g., 3 R. HuRSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 22.4 (2d
ed. 1975) (issue in products liability drug cases frequently is adequacy of manufacturer's
warning with respect to dangers of drug).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965):
Comment k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which,
in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe
for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field
[Vol. 3
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ever, goes much further, shielding manufacturers of dangerous products
from liability regardless of the social utility of the product or the availa-
bility of reasonable safety devices or other precautions."
The inherent warning rationale also has some validity, for an ade-
quate warning can relieve a manufacturer from liability in appropriate
cases. 7 To justify this rationale, the Campo court used as examples an
axe, buzz saw, and the exposed propeller of an aircraft, products whose
simplistic and singular dangers are easily appreciated by the normal
user and which generally cannot be made more safe." The deficiency of
this rationale, however, arises either where the product is relatively
complex or where it reasonably could have been made more safe." To
of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences
when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death,
both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstand-
ing the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not
defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally
be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also
true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience
as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medi-
cally recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortun-
nate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to
supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
66. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 28, at § 28.5, at 1543; Wade, Strict Tort Liability
of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965). A consequence of obviation of the manufac-
turer's duty is a failure to encourage safety devices or to spread to the producers the costs
of the injuries that their products cause. See, e.g., Meyer v. Gehl Co., 36 N.Y.2d 760, 762-
65, 329 N.E.2d 666, 667-69, 368 N.Y.S.2d 834, 834-38 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting)
(summarizes academic and judicial attacks on Campo latent-patent doctrine).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment j (1965):
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller
may be required to give directions or warnings, on the container, as to its
use. . . . But a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingre-
dients in them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in
excessive quantity, or over a long period of time, when the danger, or potential-
ity of danger, is generally known and recognized.
68. 301 N.Y. at 472, 95 N.E.2d at 804; see, e.g., Jameison v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247
F.2d 23, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (rubber exerciser characterized as simple item for which
warning was not necessary), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co.,
383 Mich. 158, 174 N.W.2d 752 (1970) (danger of injury from broken bottles was so obvious
warning was not required of manufacturer). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
388, comment k (1965).
69. As the complexity of the product increases, so too does the difficulty in appreciating
the danger inherent in the product. Compare Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co., 383 Mich. 158,
19771
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be adequate, a warning should be of such import that the user is actually
and fully aware of the specific risk of injury inherent in the product"0
and in our modern society few products are so simple as to meet this
standard without providing an express, specific warning of the dangers."
The Campo inherent warning rationale therefore is of extremely limited
applicability. In addition, if a safety device reasonably could have been
utilized, even a specific warning should not necessarily relieve the man-
ufacturer from liability. The Campo decision, though, operates to bar
recovery even when a complex product causes the injury, without regard
to whether the reasonable safety devices were available, so long as the
danger was obvious.1
3
The third primary rationale of the latent-patent rule is that manufac-
turers should not be liable when their products are misused or are care-
lessly used by consumers who are fully aware of the dangers involved. 4
Initially, this rationale may seem to have some validity, but it actually
represents one of the major problems created by the Campo doctrine. 5
174 N.W.2d 752 (1970) with Wilhelm v. Detroit Edison Co., 56 Mich. App. 116, 150, 224
N.W.2d 289, 305 (1974) (distinguished from Fisher because instrumentality causing injury
was series of three uninsulated high tension lines) and Coger v. Mackinaw Prods. Co., 48
Mich. App. 113, 121-22, 210 N.W.2d 124, 128 (1973) (court refused to view mechanical log
splitter as simple tool but rather as "a complicated mechanical contrivance which in-
creased the danger and risks involved manyfold"). In addition, a warning may not obviate
liability where the product could reasonably have been made more safe. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965) (warning may relieve manu-
facturer from liability if "unavoidably unsafe" product is "properly prepared").
70. See, e.g., Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 325,
79 N.W.2d 688, 693 (1956) (warning must be accurate).Warnings can fail for various
reasons. See Tinnerholm v Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(insufficient intensity of warning in light of brain damage which resulted from use of
drug); Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 18, 28 (Mo. 1961) (warning ambiguous and not
sufficiently prominent); McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 861-
62, 75 S.E.2d 712, 723-24 (1953) (directions without warning of danger are inadequate).
See generally Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23
Sw. L.J. 256 (1969).
71. See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N'.Y.2d 330, 340, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461,
468 (1973):
Advances in the technologies of materials, of processes, of operational means
have put it almost entirely out of the reach of the consumer to comprehend why
or how the article operates, and thus even farther out of his reach to detect when
there may be a defect or a danger present in its design or manufacture. In
today's world, it is often only the manufacturer who can fairly be said to know
and understand when an article is suitably designed and safely made for its
intended purpose.
72. See note 69 supra.
73. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
74. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 473-74, 95 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1950).
75. Confusion has plagued many courts in the use of the Campo doctrine because they
have attempted to apply it in conjunction with other defenses based on plaintiffs' conduct,
such as contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse. See, e.g., Tomicich v.
252 [Vol. 3
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The plaintiff's negligence has always been considered an important fac-
tor in establishing liability in personal injury cases, but generally in
relation to the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence"6 and as-
sumption of risk 7 or the defense of misuse." These defenses, however,
differ markedly from the latent-patent rule, and are much more protec-
tive of injured plaintiffs. For example, the affirmative defenses of contri-
butory negligence and assumption of risk must be pleaded and proved
by the defendant,79 and in most jurisdictions only operate to reduce
recovery under comparative negligence laws."0 In contrast, under the
latent-patent rule, which is not an affirmaive defense,' the plaintiff
Western-Knapp Eng. Co., 423 F.2d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1970) (although citing Campo for
proposition that manufacturer owes no duty for obvious danger, court couched decision
in terms of assumption of risk); Neusus v. Sponholtz, 369 F.2d 259, 263 (7th Cir. 1966)
(citing Campo, court found that either misuse or contributory negligence would bar recov-
ery where fireman climbed jammed ladder knowing safety latches were disengaged).
76. Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which the defendant has the
burden of pleading and proving. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65,
at 416 (4th ed. 1971). Application of the defense is achieved through an objective, reasona-
ble person standard.See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 463, 464 (1965).
77. See, e.g., Parr v. Hamnes, 303 Minn. 333, 337-39, 228 N.W.2d 234, 237-38 (1975)
(plaintiff cannot assume risk unless he is aware of specific danger and acts voluntarily and
unreasonably in light of that knowledge); Meulners v. Hawkes, 299 Minn. 76, 79-80, 216
N.W.2d 633, 635 (1974) (contributory negligence and assumption of risk distinguished).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 496A-496E (1965); James, Assumption
of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968).
78. The defense of misuse is similar to the latent-patent rule in that neither is an
affirmative defense and both address the question whether the product which caused the
injury was defective. See Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965); Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 793, 50
Cal. Rptr. 143 (1966); Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279
(1974). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g (1965).
79. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 416 (4th ed. 1971).
80. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1974) (adopted in 1970). Although initially assump-
tion of risk was a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery, in states with comparative negli-
gence laws it generally is considered a type of contributory negligence and subject to
comparative negligence analysis. See, e.g., Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24-25,
192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971).
The courts have reached conflicting results in the issue of whether their states' compara-
tive negligence statutes should apply in strict products liability cases. Compare Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (strict liability is akin to negligence per se
and therefore is subject to Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute) with Kirkland v.
General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974) (Oklahoma comparative negligence
statute not applicable because strict liability not based on negligence). See generally
Note, A Reappraisal of Contributory Fault in Strict Products Liability Law, 2 WM. MITCH-
ELL L. REV. 235 (1976).
81. Initially, the Campo court required the plaintiff plead and prove the latency of the
defect in order to establish a prima facie case. See 301 N.Y. at 471, 95 N.E.2d at 802. The
pleading requirement was vitiated in Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d
769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1974). In Halvorson, the Minnesota court apparently adopted the
Campo rule that the plaintiff must prove the danger was not obvious in order to establish
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normally must establish that the danger was not obvious 2 and if he fails
to do so he is barred from recovery despite any comparative negligence
laws.S
Additionally, to establish the defense of assumption of risk, the de-
fendant must prove not only that the plaintiff was aware of the danger
but also that the plaintiff acted voluntarily and unreasonably in light
of that awareness." Under Campo, however, obviousness alone bars
recovery.85 Because both theories stress awareness of the danger, the
that the product was defective. See - Minn. at __, 240 N.W.2d at 308. In Halvorson,
the court suggested that lack of obviousness was not an affirmative defense but part of
the plaintiff's burden of proof. Id.
82. See Siemer v. Midwest Mower Corp., 286 F.2d 381, 385 (8th Cir. 1961); Hays v.
Western Auto Supply Co., 405 S.W.2d 877, 882 (Mo. 1966); Parker v. Heasler Plumbing
& Heating Co., 388 P.2d 516, 519 (Wyo. 1964) (plaintiff must prove latency of danger).
The Campo decision is not clear as to whether an objective or subjective standard
should be applied when determining whether the danger was obvious. The issue was
clarified, however, in Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895,
164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957), where the court based its findings that the danger of personal
injury from falling off an unrailed house porch was obvious on an objective evaluation of
the defect as seen by a reasonable person. This decision has been criticised for not focusing
on the latency of the danger as distinguished from the defect. See Noel, Design Liability,
supra note 40, at 838. Inman also is inconsistent with the inherent warning rationale which
requires full appreciation of the risk. But see Hardy v. Hill Corp., 446 F.2d 34 (9th Cir.
1971) (court, citing Campo, in an industrial accident case found that unreasonably dan-
gerous defect criteria of strict liability was determined by objective rather than subjective
standard). The Minnesota Supreme Court, on the other hand, seems to have applied a
subjective standard when invoking the latent-patent test. See Halvorson v. American
Hoist & Derrick Co., - Minn. -, -, 240 N.W.2d 303, 308 (1976) (court stresses
that "the plaintiff ... knew of the danger involved"); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285
Minn. 32, 43, 171 N.W.2d 201, 208 (1969) ("The awareness, which has been clearly estab-
lished by plaintiffs testimony, not only negatives any claim of defect, but certainly takes
this snowmobile out of the category of being unreasonably dangerous.").
83. For a plaintiff to establish a negligence cause of action, he must prove the defendant
owed a duty to him, that the duty was breached by the defendant, that the breach was a
direct cause of plaintiff's injuries, and that the plaintiff in fact suffered an injury. E.g.,
Schmanski v. Church of St. Casimer of Wells, 243 Minn. 289, 292, 67 N.W.2d 644, 646
(1954). To establish his prima facie case in a strict products liability action the plaintiff
must prove a defect which caused an unreasonable danger, that the defect existed at the
time the product left the manufacturer's control, and that the defect caused the injury.
E.g., Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 39-40, 171 N.W.2d 201, 206 (1969). The
effect of the obvious characteristic of the danger under the Campo doctrine is to obviate
the manufacturer's duty in a negligence action and the existence of a defect in a strict
products liability action. Compare Poppell v. Waters, 126 Ga. App. 385, 190 S.E.2d 815
(1972) with Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg. Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969). Therefore,
because comparative fault analysis is only applicable when the plaintiff establishes his
prima facie case, the Campo doctrine precludes use of the comparative fault approach
where the danger was obvious. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 67 (4th ed. 1971).
84. See, e.g., Haessly v. Lotzer, - Minn .... 245 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1976)
(assumption of risk refers to "conscious and voluntary decision to encounter a known
risk.").
85. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
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latent-patent rule is applicable in most instances where the assumption
of risk defense might apply, but the difference in result depending on
the theory utilized can be drastic."6
The Campo doctrine differs from the misuse defense in that the latter
is applicable where the injured person used the product in a manner
which the manufacturer could not reasonably be expected to foresee. s7
The misuse defense basically embodies the concept that a product is not
defective if it is safe only for ordinary and foreseeable uses,8 thereby
requiring the manufacturer, as an expert, to make the product safe for
such foreseeable uses." The latent-patent test, however, is not con-
cerned with whether the plaintiff's use of the product was foreseeable
by the manufacturer, so long as the danger was obvious. Because any
danger obvious to the normal user undoubtedly will be foreseeable to the
manufacturer, the Campo doctrine encompasses the misuse defense and
renders it largely irrelevant as a distinct legal concept."
The concepts of misuse, assumption of risk, and comparative negli-
86. See, e.g., Kerber v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 411 F.2d 419, 421 (8th Cir.
1969) (applying Missouri law and Campo doctrine, court found no manufacturer's duty
in products liability case; holding supported by ruling that plaintiff's actions may have
been assumption of risk). By applying the latent-patent test instead of assumption of risk,
the protection afforded the injured plaintiff may be significantly reduced for several rea-
sons. First, although the defect may be obvious, the specific danger created by it may not
be. Second, the user of the product may be in a position where he has no alternative but
to use the product in spite of the danger. Third, the latent-patent rule serves to bar
recovery, while the assumption of risk defense normally only reduces recovery. See Mar-
schall, An Obvious Wrong, supra note 52, at 1085-86.
87. Compare Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 855-56 (5th Cir. 1967)
(unintended and unforeseen mixture of products of two cosmetics manufacturers excused
makers for responsibility for any injury), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968) with Dunham
v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 327-31, 229 N.E.2d 684, 690-91 (1967)
(misuse of claw hammer where it is used by plaintiff on farm machinery is foreseeable).
88. See, e.g, Troszynski v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 42 Ill. App. 3d 925, 930, 356
N.E.2d 926, 930-31 (1976); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d
305, 309 (1970) ("use it for a purpose neither intended nor 'foreseeable' (objectively reason-
able) by the defendant"); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negli-
gence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAN. L. REv. 93, 95-96 (1972).
89. Concerning the foreseeability factor, the manufacturer is held to the knowledge and
skill of an expert in his industry to ensure he keeps abreast of industry product changes
and provides sufficient research into the consumer use of products. See, e.g., Green v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 485 F.2d 430, 433 (6th Cir. 1973) (in defining a product
defect, court stated that "flit also requires proof that the nature of 'the defect' was such
that the manufacturer under the reasonable man standard could have foreseen that some-
one might be injured thereby"); Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 242-43 (4th Cir.
1971); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 331-32, 154 N.W.2d 488, 496 (1967).
90. If the danger of consumer injury was obvious to the consumer, it should be foreseea-
ble and necessitate either a warning, safety device, or instructions for its safe use. See,
e.g., Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 326, 79 N.W.2d
688, 693-94 (1956).
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gence represent an equitable approach whereby the manufacturer is
required to make his products safe for all foreseeable uses while at the
same time the plaintiff's recovery is reduced if he is aware of the danger
yet voluntarily and unreasonably uses the product." Adoption of the
latent-patent rule, however, destroys the utility of this approach. By
denying recovery solely because the danger created by the product was
obvious, 2 the rule punishes the injured plaintiff even if he has not acted
voluntarily and unreasonably, frustrates the important policy consider-
ations underlying comparative negligence, and allows the manufacturer
to avoid liability even though it has placed a product in the market
which creates foreseeable dangers."
In summary, the latent-patent rule and its rationales are contrary to
the general thrust of modern products liability law. The rule paints with
a broad brush, covering all products regardless of their social utility, the
availability of safety devices and warnings, or the foreseeable dangers
they create. As a consequence, manufacturers are neither encouraged to
make their products more safe nor required to pay compensation for the
injuries caused by their dangerous products.'4
I. THE MINNESOTA APPROACH TO OBVIOUSNESS
The Minnesota approach to the concept of the obvious danger will be
analyzed in the following four stages: case law discussing the role of
obviousness; the social policy underlying current Minnesota products
liability law and how Halvorson conflicts with that policy; the definition
of a defect as defined by the Minnesota Supreme Court and how the
adoption of the latent-patent rule would affect that definition; and fi-
nally the problems raised by Halvorson in conjunction with Minnesota's
comparative fault scheme.
91. See, e.g., Note, A Reappraisal of Contributory Fault in Strict Products Liability
Law, 2 Wm. MrrcHEa. L. REv. 235, 248-49 (1976).
92. See, e.g., Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 523, 460 P.2d 191, 194 (1969) (court
applied objective, reasonable man standard in determining whether danger was obvious);
Parker v. Healser Plumbing & Heating Co., 388 P.2d 516, 518 (Wyo. 1964) (where no latent
defect can be proved there is no recovery).
93. This is repugnant to current loss allocation theories. Most courts and commentators
find that the primary objective of current liability theories is to produce safer products,
not more obviously dangerous ones. See, e.g., Palmer v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash.
App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d 713, 719 (1970).
94. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
("manufacturers ought to make safer not more dangerous products"), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339
(3d Cir. 1973); Askew v. Howard-Cooper Corp., 263 Ore. 184, 187, 502 P.2d 210, 212 (1972)
(dissenting opinion) (literal effect of Campo rule is to encourage more obvious defects
rather than safer products; standard of manufacturer foreseeability should be used); Pal-
mer v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d 713, 719 (1970) ("The law,
we think, ought to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious form").
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A. The Concept of Obviousness in Minnesota Law
The concept of awareness or obviousness as a bar to recovery finds its
Minnesota origins in early Minnesota products liability law. In the 1892
case of Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co.," the Minnesota court adopted a
standard similar to that enunciated in Campo. The Schubert court, in
a well-written opinion, held that the manufacturer of a product, which
had a danger known to the manufacturer but concealed from the user,
was liable for injuries arising from use of the product." Although
Schubert and its progeny97 are similar to Campo, at the time Schubert
was decided it actually was a liberal, vanguard decision." Obviously, in
the volatile products liability area, a decision that would have been
heralded 85 years ago is not necessarily an appropriate one today.
Early vestiges of the latent-patent rule can also be found in the
"simple tool doctrine."" This doctrine of master-servant relations was
founded on the premise that the employer had a duty to use ordinary
care in keeping instrumentalities and working areas safe through reason-
95. 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892).
96. Id. at 336, 51 N.W. at 1104. Schubert involved an employee who was injured while
climbing a ladder made of defective wood. The employee sued the manufacturer, based
upon negligence. Despite the lack of privity, the court refused to dismiss plaintiffs com-
plaint, reasoning as follows:
It would constitute an actionable wrong for the defendant to thus knowingly and
unnecessarily do what it had reason to suppose would result in injury to the
plaintiff without the intervention of any fault or neglect on his part or on the
part of any other person. If the defendant knowingly delivered such an article
for the plaintiff's use, it was his duty to warn him of the danger by disclosing
the hidden defects; and neglect of that duty would constitute actionable negli-
gence. Every one may be supposed to understand that such articles are manu-
factured, sold, and disposed of, with a view of their being used. They are valua-
ble and salable only because of their supposed fitness for use. One who procures
such an article, either from a manufacturer or from a retail dealer, ordinarily
assumes without inquiry, and without any express warranty, that it is what it
appears to be, a thing intended for actual use; and that it has not been so
negligently manufactured that by reason of concealed defects its use will be
attended with danger of serious injury.
Id.
97. See O'Brien v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012 (1910) (in case
involving a defective bridge, court held that builder was liable when bridge collapsed and
injured plaintiffs, since danger was concealed); Holmvik v. Parsons Band Cutter & Self-
Feeder Co., 98 Minn. 424, 108 N.W. 810 (1906) (defendant manufacturer of self-feeder
deck held liable for injuries resulting from collapse of deck, since danger created by
defective deck was known by manufacturer but was not obvious to plaintiff).
98. Schubert was decided 24 years before MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which is considered by most authorities as marking the com-
mencement of modern American products liability law. See note 46 supra and accom-
panying text.
99. See Heise v. J. R. Clark Co., 245 Minn. 179, 71 N.W.2d 818 (1955) (collapsed ladder
not simple tool); Person v. Okes, 224 Minn. 541, 29 N.W.2d 360 (1947) (step stool is simple
tool); Mozey v. Erickson, 182 Minn. 419, 234 N.W. 687 (1931) (stepladder is simple tool).
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able inspections.' °° The master did not have this responsibility for sim-
ple or common tools.'0 ' Rationales very similar to that found in Campo
supported this doctrine, 0 2 as well as the reasoning that the employer and
employee had equal ability to ascertain dangers and prevent injuries. 0
The simple tool doctrine was not expanded by the Minnesota court into
areas where the danger was latent or where other than very simple tools
such as step ladders were involved.0 4 Thus, early in Minnesota tort law,
the employee was made to bear the costs of injuries suffered in the use
of uncomplicated products with obvious dangers.
More recently, the role of obviousness was revitalized in Magnuson v.
Rupp Manufacturing, Inc.,'" a Minnesota strict products liability case
which placed great emphasis on the awareness concept.' 0 The
Magnuson court held the plaintiff-snowmobiler's knowledge of the dan-
gerous placement of the spark plug, 07 which jammed against and se-
verely injured his knee,' 0 obviated the existence of a defect under the
strict products liability theory.'°9 The Magnuson decision is confusing,
with numerous alternative holdings," the apparent result of the court's
initial grappling with concept of strict products liability.", The court's
formula for a prima facie strict liability case in Magnuson concluded
with the unique additional requirement that the injury must not be
caused by a voluntary, unusual, or abnormal handling of the product
by the plaintiff;"' this was interpreted as requiring that the plaintiff not
100. E.g., Person v. Okes, 224 Minn. 541, 543, 29 N.W.2d 360, 362 (1947) (small steplad-
der is simple tool).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 543, 29 N.W.2d at 362 ("The rule has no application where the master has
knowledge of the defect and the servant does not and where the defect is of such a
character as not to be obvious from observation ordinarily accompanying its use.").
103. Id. at 543-44, 29 N.W.2d at 362.
104. See Heise v. J. R. Clark Co., 245 Minn. 179, 186-87, 71 N.W.2d 818, 823-24 (1955).
105. 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969).
106. See generally Comment, Products Liability: The Victim's Conduct as a Bar to
Recovery-The Minnesota Supreme Court Reaffirms the Magnuson "Limiting Factors," 1
WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 207 (1974).
107. 285 Minn. at 41, 171 N.W.2d at 207.
108. Id. at 36, 171 N.W.2d at 204.
109. Id. at 42, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
110. Note, A Reappraisal of Contributory Fault In Strict Products Liability Law, 2 WM.
MrrcHELL L. REv. 235, 253 (1976) (Magnuson court based its ruling on alternative grounds
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, abnormal use, mishandling, lack of proxi-
mate causation, and lack of defect).
111. Magnuson represents the first time the Minnesota court was faced with the issue
of the role of contributory fault in the strict products liability theory.
112. 285 Minn. at 39-40, 171 N.W.2d at 206. In establishing the elements of a strict
products liability case, the court stated:
In summary, we find that under the strict liability doctrine plaintiff must prove
(1) a defect; (2) causing unreasonable danger; (3) in existence at the time the
product was in possession of tle defendant to be charged; (4) causing injury;
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be aware of the danger."' Magnuson therefore can be read as holding
that obvious dangers preclude a finding of a defect, but the case is not
entirely clear on this issue.
The Halvorson court, relying in part on Magnuson, again emphasized
the role of awareness in Minnesota products liability law. 1' The injured
plaintiff's testimony that he was aware of the lethal dangers created by
overhead power lines was given great emphasis by the court."' Relying
on the plaintiff's awareness, the court precluded recovery by finding
that the manufacturer did not have a duty to protect against electrical
injuries because the danger was obvious."' Halvorson unfortunately suf-
fers from the same problems as Magnuson, with the case being suscepti-
ble to at least three possible interpretations. Because it cites Campo
favorably, Halvorson can be interpreted as adopting the latent-patent
rule for all Minnesota products liability cases." 7 Alternatively,
Halvorson can be read as adopting the latent-patent rule only in situa-
tions where the danger was obvious, the plaintiff had special knowledge
of the danger, and the manufacturer provided warnings of the danger."8
Finally, Halvorson can be interpreted as adopting the Campo doctrine
only where the elements of the second interpretation are present and in
addition the manufacturer had no reasonable safety devices available to
correct the danger." 9 Although uniform in their emphasis on awareness,
both Magnuson and Halvorson, because of their susceptibility to varied
interpretations, therefore, are inadequate for use as statements of the
proper role of awareness in Minnesota products liability law.
In contrast to the approaches taken by the court in Magnuson and
Halvorson, it has treated awareness quite differently on other occasions.
An example is the court's only pre-Halvorson examination of the Campo
decision, which occurred in Clark v. Rental Equipment Co.,'2 a case
involving a plaintiff who was injured when he inadvertently fell from a
scaffold. The court founded its decision for the injured plaintiff on the
rationale that stringent standards should be imposed upon the lessors
of potentially dangerous products. 2' No great quantum of experience or
and (5) injury was not caused by any voluntary, unusual, or abnormal handling
by the plaintiff. [emphasis by the court].
113. Id. 'at 40-42, 171 N.W.2d at 207-08.
114. __ Minn. at _ 240 N.W.2d at 308.
115. Id.
116. Id. ("The general rule in other jurisdictions is that there is no recovery where the
danger is obvious.")
117. Id.
118. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
119. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
120. 300 Minn. 420, 220 N.W.2d 507 (1974).
121. Id. at 424, 220 N.W.2d at 510.
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awareness is necessary for one to appreciate the dangers of an unguarded
scaffold suspended twenty feet from the ground;' 2 yet the court refused
to apply Campo to bar recovery.'1 Halvorson appears to be in direct
conflict with Clark, rendering the opposite result by completely preclud-
ing recovery' 2 rather than placing the responsibility on the product
distributor to guard against obvious dangers.'
2 5
The court's most recent analysis of plaintiff's awareness of dangers,
aside from Halvorson, is Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co.,'
26
which like Halvorson involved electrical injuries.' 27 In Ferguson, the
plaintiff was a teenage urban resident who was injured severely when
he accidentally contacted a high voltage uninsulated electrical distribu-
tion line while trimming a tree in his backyard.'28 Although the court
agreed that the urban dweller should be aware that backyard lower
voltage utility wires transmit electricity,'12 it refused to hold that the
ordinary city dweller should be required to be aware of the type of lethal
charge contained in the lines which injured the plaintiff.'0 The lines
122. The undisputed testimony by an eyewitness was that the plaintiff merely walked
off the end of the unguarded scaffold. Id. at 423, 22 N.W.2d at 509. Some courts have been
particularly tough on manufacturers where the product user was injured because of his
momentary inadvertence. See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281
(1972), noted in 86 HARV. L. REv. 923 (1973). In Bexiga, a machine operator's hands were
crushed in a punch press and he sued the manufacturer alleging defective product design
because physically and financially feasible safety designs were available which would have
prevented the injury. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the manufacturer of a
machine unreasonably dangerous because it lacked feasible safety devices could not avoid
liability by asserting that the employer of the injured plaintiff should have provided the
safety equipment. The court also denied the manufacturer the defense of contributory
negligence based on the rationale that it would be inherently inequitable to find an
affirmative duty on the manufacturer's part to provide the safety device and then allow
him to escape liability because of the user's conduct.
123. The Clark court was faced with the Campo doctrine through its discussion of a New
York scaffold case that was decided under Campo, Sarnoffv. Charles Schad, Inc., 49 Misc.
2d 1059, 269 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1966). Without directly addressing the Campo rule, the Clark
court circumvented it by finding an increased duty of the lessor in this particular fact
situation.
124. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
125. Since Halvorson was decided the Minnesota court has not remained consistent in
its approach to plaintiff's awareness. In Goblirsch v. Western Land Roller Co., - Minn.
- 246 N.W.2d 687 (1976), plaintiff was injured when he placed his hand in a corn
grinding machine. The danger apparently was obvious, yet the court, without reference
to Campo or Halvorson, based its decision for the defendant on traditional assumption of
risk principles.
126. - Minn. -, 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976).
127. Id. at __, 239 N.W.2d at 192.
128. Id.
129. Id. at __, 239 N.W.2d at 194.
130. Id. ("We cannot conclude, absent special knowledge or warning, that he should
be expected to anticipate the presence of such a lethal charge as is contained in high-
voltage transmission lines .... ")..
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that injured Ferguson were of the same type as those that injured Hal-
vorson,' 3' yet the Ferguson court, which could have barred recovery
under Campo, instead held that the danger was not obvious and that
the defendant had a "high duty" to protect against such injuries.' The
apparent contradiction between Ferguson and Halvorson possibly can
be reconciled by consideration of the type of plaintiff injured. Halvor-
son, a street construction worker, presumably had a greater appreciation
of the dangers of electrical distribution lines'13 than Ferguson, an ordi-
nary city resident.'M The difference in ability to appreciate the danger
between the Halvorson and Ferguson plaintiffs, however, is tenuous at
best, since both plaintiffs admitted at trial that they were aware of the
deadly quality of electricity 135 and Halvorson was a laborer with no
apparent expertise concerning electricity. 136 Minnesota law on the
proper treatment of obviousness therefore is not clear despite the appar-
ent decision in Halvorson to adopt the Campo doctrine.
B. The Conflict Between Halvorson and the Social Policy Underlying
Minnesota Strict Products Liability Law
In McCormack v. Hankscraft, Inc., 3 1 the Minnesota Supreme Court
first stated its approval of the doctrine of strict products liability,38
basing its approval on the more equitable cost distribution achieved by
passing the costs of product-related injuries to manufacturers of the
dangerous products. 139 This loss distribution rationale is premised on the
belief that product manufacturers are in the optimum position in the
distribution sequence to reduce or eliminate hazards and to absorb and
pass on the costs of product-related injuries." 0 This rationale was most
succinctly stated in Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,"' where
131. In both Halvorson and Ferguson, the plaintiffs were injured by 8,000 volt uninsu-
lated power lines.
132. - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 194. The primary substantive issue in Ferguson
was whether the court should adopt the abnormally dangerous theory of strict liability for
injuries caused by uninsulated, electrical transmission lines. The court rejected this
theory, but nonetheless held the electrical company to a "high duty of care."
133. __ Minn. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 308.
134. - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 193.
135. Compare Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., - Minn. 240
N.W.2d 303, 305 (1976) ("Plaintiff Halvorson testified that he knew power lines ... were
dangerous") with Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., - Minn. -, , 239
N.W.2d 190, 192 (1976) (plaintiff was aware that uninsulated power lines were dangerous
but testified he did not know line that injured him was uninsulated).
136. __ Minn. at - , 240 N.W.2d at 304 (plaintiff worked on highway construction
crew); Trial Transcript at 146 (plaintiff only had eighth grade education).
137. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
138. Id. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 499-500.
139. Id. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500.
140. Id.
141. 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426 (1971).
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the court summarized the four major reasons for the strict products
liability theory. The court first pointed out that public interest in safety
was furthered by discouraging manufacturers from marketing dangerous
products to users who are in many cases unable to comprehend the
danger due to product complexity.1 4 1 Second, the court reiterated its
acceptance of the rationale that manufacturers are in the best position
to bear and distribute the losses occassioned by product-related inju-
ries."4 The third rationale cited by the court was that legal protection
should be afforded the consumer to promote product safety and encour-
age manufacturers to settle claims rather than litigate them."' Finally,
the ability to bring an action directly against the manufacturer was
favored by the court.' These policy considerations in effect are prem-
ised upon the more equitable allocation of the losses caused by modern
products and on increased manufacturer responsibility to produce safe
products." '
If Halvorson is interpreted as adopting the latent-patent rule for all
products liability cases, it clearly frustrates these important social and
economic policies. So long as the danger is patent, the defendant manu-
facturer of foreseeably dangerous products would not have a duty to
protect the product user from injury. Consequently, the plaintiff would
be foreclosed from recovery and any loss distribution which might have
occurred would be lost. In addition, the manufacturer would not be
deterred from producing foreseeably dangerous products but rather
would be exculpated from liability whenever the danger is latent. There-
fore, if the important policies expressed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in McCormack and Lee are to be preserved, the apparent decision
in Halvorson to adopt the latent-patent rule must be modified.
C. Definition of a Defective Product
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in the ten years since it first adopted
the strict products liability theory,' 7 has yet to establish a coherent
definition of what constitutes a defective product."' Halvorson both
142. Id. at 327, 188 N.W.2d at 431.
143. Id. at 328, 188 N.W.2d at 431.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 328, 188 N.W.2d at 431-32.
146. In Lee, the court did not include awareness as one element of the plaintiffs prima
facie case, as was done in Magnuson, but rather cited Magnuson as holding that awareness
is a factor under the assumption of risk defense. See 290 Minn. at 329-30, 188 N.W.2d at
432.
147. The Minnesota Supreme Court first expressed its approval of the strict products
liability theory in 1967. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d
488 (1967).
148. The most thorough attempt by the Minnesota court to define what constitutes a
defective product occurred in Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d
64 (1970). The court in Farr stated that "a product is defective if it fails to perform
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exemplifies and exacerbates this problem.
The confusion in Minnesota products liability law is well illustrated
by the Halvorson jury instructions and resulting jury findings. The trial
court instructed the jury under the strict liability count on three sepa-
rate definitions of what constitutes a defective product, and also gave a
negligence instruction. Applying these instructions, the jury, apparently
and understandably confused, found the defendant was negligent but
not strictly liable. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, held the
jury findings were inconsistent, on the theory that the strict liability
theory subsumes the negligence theory and therefore a finding of no
strict liability necessarily precludes a finding of negligence. Although
much respected authority can be found supporting the court's holding,",
the supposed inconsistency in the jury's findings can be logically ration-
alized based on the varying standards set forth in the jury instructions.
The strict liability instructions given to the jury emphasized a con-
sumer expectation standard, whereby a product is not defective if it
meets the safety expectations of ordinary consumers. 15 Conversely, how-
ever, the negligence instruction made liability turn on traditional negli-
gence concepts relating to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's con-
duct in producing the crane. 5' A determination that consumer expecta-
tions were low with respect to the danger of electrocution and that
therefore the defendant was not strictly liable does not necessarily pre-
clude a finding that the manufacturer failed to exercise due care in the
design of its crane. 5 2 In other words, fault might exist despite the fact
that the consumer expectation standard was met.
reasonably, adequately and safely the normal, anticipated or specified use to which the
manufacturer intends that it be put." Id. at 89, 179 N.W.2d at 68. This definition is similar
to that contained in the RESTATEMENT. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment h (1965).
149. See, e.g., Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825 passim (1973); Note, Products Liability: The Victim's Conduct as a Bar to Recovery-
The Minnesota Supreme Court Reaffirms the Magnuson "Limiting Factors," 1 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 207, 217 (1974) (cited in Halvorson). See generally 1 R. HURSH & H.
BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABiLrrY §§ 1:1-:43 (1974).
150. The three definitions of a defect under the strict liability count were (1) a product
is not defective if it performs reasonably, adequately, and safely for its normal, intended,
and anticipated uses; (2) a product is not defective, even though dangerous, when used
by a person with common community knowledge as to the product's characteristics and
usage; and (3) a product is defective if not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for
which it is sold and expected to be used. - Minn. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 306.
151. The trial court stated in its negligence instructions that defendant was liable if it
failed to use reasonable care in the design, manufacture, inspection, and testing of the
product to protect users from unreasonable risk of harm, and that the manufacturer must
warn against reasonably foreseeable dangers. Id. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 306-07.
152. See Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Prod-
uct Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297 (1977) (excellent analysis of difference
between strict liability, consumer expectation standard and traditional risk utility, negli-
gence standard; suggests liability should be imposed if either standard is breached).
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When the consumer expectation standard is coupled with the rule
that one cannot be negligent if found not to be strictly iiable, the result
can be that a manufacturer is protected from liability even if negligent.
This incongruous result is magnified if the Campo doctrine is utilized,
since it basically represents an extreme extension of the consumer ex-
pectation standard, obviating liability for obvious dangers regardless of
the reasonableness of the defendant's actions. Consequently, the Campo
doctrine clearly is an inappropriate, backward concept which should not
be adopted in Minnesota. In addition, Halvorson indicates the need to
establish a coherent approach to the issue of defectiveness to the exclu-
sion of all others, since failure to do so is productive of practical prob-
lems in the day-to-day application of the strict products liability theory
in an understandable fashion.'
D. Halvorson's Conflict with Minnesota's Comparative Fault Scheme
An additional problem created by Halvorson concerns the defense of
assumption of risk and Minnesota's comparative negligence statute. In
1970, the Minnesota Legislature adopted a comparative negligence stat-
ute.'u Shortly thereafter, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Springrose
v. Willmore, 5 emphasizing the important policies underlying compara-
tive fault, decided the statute should apply to the assumption of risk
defense.151 Thus, proof of assumption of risk normally will operate only
to reduce recovery.'57 The court also has emphasized in recent years that
to establish that the plaintiff assumed the risk, the defendant not only
must show the plaintiff was subjectively aware of the danger, but also
that the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encountered the known
danger.' Under the latent-patent rule, however, the above protections
153. In this respect, Dean Keeton's observations are appropriate:
Our supreme courts should arrive at a theory of recovery to the exclusion of all
others. Trial judges cannot under the present state of the law be criticized for
being unable to submit a product liability case to a jury in a satisfactory man-
ner. This situation emphasizes the fact that lack of efficiency in the administra-
tion of justice is often due to the complexities and ambiguities of the substantive
law rather than to either court organization or court procedures.
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 36 (1973).
154. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976).
155. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
156. Id. at 26, 192 N.W.2d at 828. The court noted that the comparative negligence
statute did not specifically apply to the assumption of risk defense but nonetheless made
the defense subject to the statute, stating that "the apportionment of loss between blame-
worthy plaintiffs and defendants is in harmony with its [the legislature's] manifest
determination of public policy regarding tort reparation." Id.
157. Under Minnesota's comparative negligence statute recovery is still barred if the
plaintiff's negligence is equal to or greater than the negligence of the defendant. See MINN.
STAT. § 604.01 (1976).
158. See, e.g., Haessly v. Lotzer, - Minn. , , 245 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1976)
(plaintiff did not assume risk because he did not voluntarily use stairway with "full
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afforded plaintiffs are eliminated. Obviousness alone bars recovery, and,
because the plaintiff cannot prove the product was defective if the dan-
ger was obvious, the comparative negligence statute is not applicable.
As a result, the Campo doctrine in effect supersedes both the assump-
tion of risk defense and the comparative negligence statute in all cases
where the danger is obvious, thus frustrating the important policy of
allocating costs which underlies Minnesota's comparative fault scheme.
The above discussion indicates the latent-patent rule, as apparently
adopted in Halvorson, clearly is inappropriate in Minnesota, being in
conflict with the important policies established both by the Minnesota
Supreme Court and the Minnesota Legislature. In its stead, a balancing
approach should be utilized which more equitably allocates responsibil-
ity in products liability cases.
IV. THE BALANCING APPROACH-AN ALTERNATIVE TO Campo
Several recent, well-reasoned decisions have abandoned the Campo
doctrine and have adopted a balancing approach in which obviousness
is but one minor factor to consider when determining whether the prod-
uct Was unreasonably dangerous. 5 ' The unreasonably dangerous deter-
mination is based upon a balancing of the likelihood and severity of the
injury with the precautions which would have been necessary to make
the product safe. 6 ' Within this formula, obviousness may be relevant in
determining the likelihood of injury, for if the danger is obvious, the
product user probably will take steps to protect himself, thereby de-
creasing the likelihood of injury. " ' Through this balancing approach, the
courts attempt to view the entire situation which produced the injury,
including the foreseeability of the injury, the utility of the product, the
ability to make safer products, and the seriousness of probable inju-
ries. ' 2 As a result, the balancing approach substantially mitigates the
rigidity of the Campo rule by eliminating obviousness as an automatic
bar to recovery.
6 3
knowledge and conscious awareness of the unique and special hazards" of stairway).
159. See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339
(3d Cir. 1973); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1970); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976);
Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970).
160. The approach is actually quite similar to traditional negligence analysis, which
involves a balancing of several factors rather than complete reliance on only one factor.
See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand,
J.) (famous calculus of duty formula); Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
161. See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
162. See note 171 infra and accompanying text.
163. This is the rationale the New York Court of Appeals relied upon when abandoning
the Campo doctrine. See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384
N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
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The reasoning of a leading case, Dorsey v. Yoder Co., ," illustrates the
use of this balancing approach. In Dorsey, the plaintiff factory worker's
hand was sucked into the blades of a metal slitter and almost ampu-
tated." 5 Plaintiff alleged defective design because of the lack of an ade-
quate safety device,"' and defendant manufacturer responded by assert-
ing that the danger was obvious and therefore recovery was barred under
Campo. 7 The case could have been resolved expeditiously by applying
the latent-patent rule, since the facts indicate the danger created by the
metal slitting machine was obvious to the plaintiff."' The Dorsey court,
however, rejected the Campo approach and held that obviousness is only
one factor in determining whether the product was unreasonably dan-
gerous.' 6 Quoting from an important article by Dean Wade,'" the court
suggested seven relevant factors which must be considered in determin-
ing whether the product was defective: (1) the social utility of the prod-
uct; (2) availability of safer products to meet the same need; (3) likeli-
hood of injury and its probable seriousness; (4) obviousness of the dan-
ger; (5) common public knowledge and expectations of the danger; (6)
avoidability of injury through instructions and warnings; and (7) availa-
bility of not unduly expensive safety devices or safer designs. Weighing
all these considerations, the court ruled that a jury verdict for the plain-
tiff was justified despite the obviousness of the danger."'
When discussing the role obviousness should play within the balanc-
ing test, the Dorsey court made clear that it was relevant primarily in
relation to simple, established products with well-understood dangers.'
The court used as an example a sharp knife,' which it stated would not
be unreasonably dangerous because the danger is obvious, a safety de-
vice would destroy its utility, and the cost of making it safe would be
prohibitive.'7 4 Because of simple, common products such as knives,
which can cause injuries even when properly made and whose potential
164. 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), af'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
165. Id. at 757.
166. Id. at 757-64 (plaintiff alleged negligence and strict liability, but case was decided
under strict liability theory).
167. Id. at 757-58.
168. Id. at 757 (plaintiff placed hand nine inches from cutters to prevent metal from
buckling and failed to use hold down bar that had been provided by machine manufac-
turer for that purpose).
169. Id. at 759.
170. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
171. 331 F. Supp. at 760. The court balanced the fact that a safety guard was affordable
and would not interfere with the operation of the machine against the severe injuries that
resulted from the accident and found that the jury was justified in tipping the balance to
the plaintiff's favor in finding the product defective.
172. Id. at 759-60.
173. Id. at 759.
174. Id. at 760.
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dangers are understood by the general public, the obviousness factor
must remain a part of the balancing approach.' However, when the
product is neither simple nor common, such as complex machinery or
even a lawn mower, the clear tendency of the better reasoned decisions
applying the balancing approach has been to minimize or eliminate
obviousness of the danger as a factor when deciding whether the product
was unreasonably dangerous.17 ' A vivid example of this tendency is
found in Micallef v. Miehle Co.,'77 a recent decision by the New York
Court of Appeals, the same court that established the latent-patent rule
in Campo.
In Micallef, the plaintiff, an offset printing press operator, was se-
verely injured when he purposely placed his hand on a printing plate
cylinder which was spinning at a high rate of speed.' The machine was
150 feet long, fifteen feet high, and five feet wide, and it was capable of
printing approximately 20,000 sheets per hour; 7' obviously, the machine
was a far different product from the axe, buzz saw, and propeller envi-
sioned by the Campo court. 8' Yet, the danger apparently was obvious
and, consequently, the lower court, applying the latent-patent test, held
for the defendant.' The court of appeals reversed, commencing its opin-
ion with the statement that "[tihe time has come to depart from the
patent danger rule enunciated in Campo,""81 and it then proceeded to
discuss in detail the harshness and inequities caused by the Campo
doctrine."3 The court stressed that in this modern age of complex, so-
phisticated, and mysterious products, responsibility must be placed
upon the manufacturer to make its products safe, since it is in the best
position to recognize and cure defects."' Because of this policy consider-
ation, certain factors within the balancing approach, in particular the
foreseeability of danger by the manufacturer" and the availability of
175. Id. at 759. The Dorsey court stated that, because of products such as knives, "to
preclude absurd results the obviousness of the danger must constitute but one of the
factors that determines whether the danger is unreasonable." Id. (emphasis by the court).
176. See, e.g., Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 144-46, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169-70, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 443, 449-50 (1972) (plaintiff's hand slipped into exposed blade of lawn mover and
court held obviousness of danger should be considered only in relation to affirmative
defense of assumption of risk).
177. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
178. Id. at 380, 348 N.E.2d at 573, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
179. Id. at 379, 348 N.E.2d at 573, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
180. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
181. 39 N.Y.2d at 381, 348 N.E.2d at 574, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
182. Id. at 379, 348 N.E.2d at 573, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
183. Id. at 382-86, 348 N.E.2d at 575-77, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 119-21.
184. Id. The court stated that "in our highly complex and technological society, we fall
victim to the manufacturer who holds himself out as an expert in his field."
185. Id. at 385-86, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121. The court stated:
To this end, we hold that a manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of
care in his plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone
19771
27
et al.: Obviousness of Product Dangers as a Bar to Recovery: Minnesota Ap
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1977
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
devices or designs which could have made the product safe,'8' were given
special emphasis by the Micallef court. The obviousness factor, on the
other hand, was available to the defendant for proof of contributory
negligence or assumption of risk.' 7
The balancing approach adopted in Dorsey, Micallef, and several
other recent decisions 8 8 is a viable theory. It places a heavy burden on
the manufacturer, as an expert and the one most able to prevent inju-
ries, to make its products safe for foreseeable uses,' but the approach
also takes into account the non-availability of adequate safety devices
and the sufficiency of warnings and instructions in proper cases.' 0 By
retaining obviousness as one factor, the balancing approach ensures that
manufacturers of common, simple products with well-understood dan-
gers will not be made insurers of their products."' The approach basi-
cally recognizes that the issue whether a product is unreasonably dan-
gerous cannot be resolved by reference to any one factor such as obvious-
ness; rather the issue must be resolved by considering all relevant fac-
tors, with recognition of the fact that the manufacturer is in a special
position of responsibility because of its ability to remedy defects and
who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is used in the manner
for which the product was intended, as well as an unintended yet reasonably
foreseeable use.
Id.
186. Id. at 386, 348 N.E.2d at 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121. The court stated that "[a]lso
relevant, but by no means exclusive, in determining whether a manufacturer exercised
reasonable skill and knowledge concerning the design of the product is whether he kept
abreast of recent scientific developments and the extent to which any tests were conducted
to ascertain the dangers of the product." Id.
187. Id. at 387, 348 N.E.2d at 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 122. The court indicated that
obviousness was still relevant in relation to the affirmative defenses of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk, stating:
That does not mean, however, that the obviousness of the danger as a factor in
the ultimate injury is thereby eliminated, for it must be remembered that in
actions for negligent design, the ordinary rules of negligence apply. Rather, the
openness and obviousness of the danger should be available to the defendant
on the issue of whether plaintiff exercised that degree of reasonable care as was
required under the circumstances.
Id.
188. See note 159 supra.
189. This result furthers the objectives underlying the development of modern products
liability law. See 86 HAV. L. RaV. 923 (1973); note 8 supra.
190. See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 348 N.E.2d 571, 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115, 121 (1976) (expense and feasibility of proposed safety devices is relevant defensive
matter for defendant); note 170 supra and accompanying text.
191. See notes 175-76 supra and accompanying text. Because of the requirement that
the risk be unreasonable, Micallef and similar cases avoid placing the manufacturer in
the position of an insurer or of requiring accident-proof products. See Dorsey v. Yoder Co.,
331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Micallef v.
Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 348 N.E.2d 571, 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121-22 (1976).
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spread the costs of injuries. The approach also complements the impor-
tant policies underlying comparative fault laws, for if the danger is
obvious to the user, that fact is relevant primarily in relation to the
affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
and those defenses only operate to reduce recovery in comparative fault
jurisdictions. Thus, the balancing approach requires a standard of care
for manufacturers commensurate with their unique capability to make
their products safe, yet reduces recovery for plaintiffs who voluntarily
and unreasonably use products when aware of the dangers those prod-
ucts create.
If the Minnesota Supreme Court in Halvorson had utilized the bal-
ancing approach, it could have reached the same result as would have
been reached under the Campo doctrine."' The manufacturer in
Halvorson had warned of the potential danger if its product was used
near high voltage power lines, the product was socially useful, its dan-
gers were generally appreciated by the users of the product, and appar-
ently it could not reasonably have been made more safe."3 Under the
balancing approach, these facts are all indications that the product was
not unreasonably dangerous and therefore not defective. Indeed, the
court emphasized most of these facts and appeared to be applying a
balancing type of approach. Consequently, the court's reliance on
Campo was unnecessary.
V. CONCLUSION
The latent-patent rule, as apparently adopted by the Minnesota Su-
preme Court in Halvorson, is an outmoded legal doctrine which conflicts
with several important, well-reasoned policies endorsed by the Minne-
sota court and legislature. By making obviousness a bar to recovery, the
latent-patent rule engulfs and renders largely useless the assumption of
risk defense, thereby frustrating the loss distribution scheme of Minne-
sota's comparative negligence statute. Rejection of the latent-patent
rule and adoption of the more equitable balancing approach would elim-
inate the harsh consequences of the Campo doctrine and ensure that
manufacturers are held responsible for product dangers that can be
foreseen and corrected. The clearest and best reasoned application of
the balancing approach is found in Dorsey and Micallef, and these cases
would provide a more rational foundation for the treatment of obvious-
ness in Minnesota products liability law than does the Campo doctrine.
192. See note 170 supra and accompanying text.
193. - Minn. at -, 240 N.W.2d at 308.
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